有一天，某学者群里提及Richard Swinburne的重要著作“Faith and Reason”已经译成中文，繁体由道风出版，简体中文由东方出版社推出。
我的处理方式是引用英文版第2版第1章第1节的全文，对读中文版，并择要简单讨论第2节里的几处。我读的内容就到此为止，所以仅仅涉及读到的部分，对其余的部分我没有评价。脚注从略。我认为值得讨论之处直接拿出来，放在一段后面，用粗体方括号说明我的讨论意见和理由。
- The Nature of Belief 第一章 信念的性质
Many religious traditions extol the virtue of faith, and in the Christian tradition faith in God who has revealed himself in Christ is seen as a major virtue. You need it in order to travel the Christian road to Heaven. But what is it to have faith in God? In the Christian tradition there have been various views on this, and in a later chapter I shall need to distinguish between these views. A major constituent of faith, on most such views, is belief-that, or propositional belief. The man or woman who has faith in God, on these views, believes that there is a God and believes certain propositions about him. However, one view claims that belief-that is not important; what matters is action. The person of faith is the person who acts on, or lives by, the assumption that there is a God and certain other assumptions. There are thus two important concepts which come into definitions of faith, and which require analysis before we can investigate head-on the concept of faith itself: these are the concept of believing that so-and-so, e.g. that there is a God; and the concept of acting on the assumption that (or acting as if ) so-and-so, e.g. that there is a God. This chapter will be devoted to analysing these concepts and to exhibiting the relation between them. We shall find that the concept of belief is not a completely clear one, and that to make it useful we shall need to tidy it a bit at the edges. 许多宗教的传统都赞美信仰的美德，而在基督教传统中，信仰那个在基督里启示自身的上帝被认为是一种主要的美德。为了经由基督教之路进入天堂，你需要这种美德。然而，什么是信仰上帝呢？在基督教传统中，人们对此有不同的观点。在下一章里，我将对这些观点加以区分。在大多数这些观点看来，信仰的主要成分是相信什么（belief-that）,或者是命题的信念（propositional belief ）。在这些观点看来，信仰上帝的善男信女,都相信有一个上帝，且相信关于上帝的某些命题。然而,有一种观点宣称，相信什么并不重要，重要的是行动。信仰者是这样一种人，他按照有一个上帝这个假设以及某些其他假设而行动或生活。因此，有两个重要的概念可用来定义信仰，这两个重要的概念要求在我们直接调查“信仰”这个概念本身之前进行分析。这两个概念就是相信某某事物（so-and-so,例如有一个上帝）的概念，以及按照某某事物（例如有一个上帝）的假设而采取行动（或者按照好像有这个假设而采取行动）的概念。本章将致力于分析这些概念，并揭示概念之间的关系。我们将发现，“信念”这个概念并不是一个完全清楚的概念，为了使它变得有用，我们需要对它的边缘作一些整理（tidy it a bit at the edges ）。
1.【in a later chapter, 与in the next chapter略微不同。译为“在后面的章节中”或许较好。<em>定冠词和不定冠词</em>】
2. 【there are thus two important concepts which come into definitions of faith. “因此，信仰的定义涉及两个重要概念”。<em>不知道。</em>】
3. 【<em><strong> and the concept of acting on the assumption that (or acting as if ) so-and-so, e.g. that there is a God</strong>. 从语法上，(or acting as if) 与acting on the assumption that等价。 <strong>以及按照某某事物（例如有一个上帝）的假设（或按照真有这事的条件）而采取行动</strong>的概念。同位语法成分放在前面较好。</em> 】
BELIEF AS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVES 一、作为相对于替代者的信念
So, then, what is it to believe that so-and-so, that today is Monday or that there is a God? I suggest that the primary concept of belief picked out by public criteria is the concept of believing so-and-so as against such-and-such. Belief is relative to alternatives. You believe one proposition as against another proposition or propositions, and what your belief in the former amounts to depends on what are the latter. The normal alternative with which a belief is contrasted is its negation. The negation of a proposition p is the proposition not-p (‘it is not the case that p’). The negation of ‘today is Monday’ is ‘it is not the case that today is Monday’ or ‘today is not Monday’. The negation of ‘there is a God’ is ‘there is no God’. Someone who has the concept of probability can express this contrastive character of belief in probabilistic terms. Normally, to believe that p is to believe that p is more probable or more likely than not-p. (I shall use ‘probable’ and ‘likely’ in the same sense.) But sometimes a belief is being contrasted with alternatives other than its negation. To believe that Labour will win the next general election may be simply to believe that it is more probable that Labour will win than that anything else will happen (e.g. the Conservatives win, or the Liberals win, or no party wins). To believe that today is Monday may be simply to believe that it is more probable that today isMonday than that it is any other day of the week. 那么，什么是相信某某事物？什么是相信今天是星期一?或者，什么是相信有一个上帝? 我认为，由大众标准挑选出来的主要的信念概念，是相信某某事物的概念，并相对于这样那样（such-and-such）的概念。信念是相对于替代者（alternatives）的。你相信一个命题而反对另一个命题或另一些命题，而你在前者中的信念是什么取决于后者是什么。与一个信念相对的标准替代者（normal alternative）是它的否定式。命题p的否定式是命题非p （不是P）。“今天是星期一”的否定式是“今天是星期一并不属实”，或者“今天不是星期一”。“有一个上帝”的否定式是“没有上帝”。 有可能性概念的人可以用可能性的术语来表达信念的这种对比特征。通常情况下，相信p就是相信p比非p更有可能。［我将在相同的意义上使用“probable”（可能的）和“likely”（可能的）。］然而，一个信念有时是与替代者而非它的否定式作对比。相信工党将赢得下届大选，可能只是相信，工党将赢得大选比其他将会发生的情况（如保守党获胜，或自由党获胜, 或没有党派获胜）更有可能。相信今天是星期一，可能只是相信，今天是星期一比今天是一周中任何其他一天更有可能。
1. 【against的翻译不一致。术语的一致性是翻译的一个重要原则。 <strong>You believe one proposition as against another proposition or propositions</strong>，你在对比的命题下或一组对比命题中相信一个命题。同理，前一句的 <strong>I suggest that the primary concept of belief picked out by public criteria is the concept of believing so-and-so as against such-and-such</strong> ，或许译为“我建议，由大众标准选择出的信念之基本概念是，在与诸如此类（such-and-such）的信念对比中选择相信了如此这般（so-and-so）的命题”。】
2. 【Someone who has<strong> the concept of probability</strong> can express this contrastive character of belief in probabilistic terms. 按照我的想法，probability译为概率，后面的statistical probabiliy = 统计概率，physical probability = 物理概率，prior probabiliy = 先验概率，posterior probability = 后验概率，and, or, not = 和，与，非……直接采用概率论术语，可以避免许多麻烦。毕竟，这是分析哲学专著。顺便说一句，国内的普兰丁格作品里的概率部分，我觉得也可以考虑如此处理。】
3. 【likely，也就译为“似然”好了， “probable”（可能的）和“<strong>likely”（似然）</strong> ，比起两个都用“可能的”，要清楚一点。】
If p is more probable than not-p, then p is probable simpliciter (and conversely). So my claim is that normally to believe that p is to believe that p is probable. (I understand p being certain as an extreme case of p being probable; it is p having a probability of 1 or close thereto.) What can be said in favour of this claim? To start with, if I believe that p is not probable, I cannot believe that p is true. If I believe that it is more probable that not-p than that p, I cannot believe that p. Examples bear this out. If I believe that it is not probable that Liverpool will win the FA cup, then (barring considerations to be discussed below arising from the existence of a number of alternatives) I cannot believe that they will win. But what about the other way round? Suppose that I do believe that p is probable. Must I believe that p? Clearly, if either I am to believe that p or I am to believe that not-p, I must believe the former. But might I not believe that p is probable without believing that p or believing that not-p? If I believe that p is very very probable, surely I believe that p. Cases where we would say the former are always cases where we would say the latter. If I believe that it is very very probable that Liverpool will win the FA Cup, then I believe that Liverpool will win. The only difficulty arises when I believe that p is marginally more probable than not. Here we might be hesitant about whether to say that I believe that p. The hesitation arises not from ignorance about any unobserved matters, but because the rules for the application of the concept of belief are not sufficiently precise. Maybe some speakers do use ‘believe’ so that S has to believe that p is significantly more probable than not if S is to believe that p. But certainly others are prepared to allow that S believes that p if S believes merely that p is marginally more probable than not. It seems tidier to follow this latter usage. For, if we do not follow this usage, there would have to be some value of probability θ between 1/2 and 1, such that only if someone believed that p had a probability greater than θ would he believe that p. But any value chosen for θ would be extremely arbitrary. I conclude that, although our ordinary rules for the use of words may not be sufficiently precise for my suggestion to be clearly correct as an account of ordinary usage, there is a case if we are to have a clear concept of ‘believe’ for tightening up usage so that the words of my suggestion do now express an analytic (i.e. logically necessary) truth. 如果p比非p更有可能，那么p是完全（simpliciter ）可能的；反之亦然。因此，我的主张是，在通常情况下，相信p就是相信p是可能的。（当 p的可能性极高时，即它有1或接近1的可能性时，我认为p是确定的。） 什么可以用来支持这个主张呢？首先，如果我相信p没有可能，我就不能相信p是真的。如果我相信非p比p更有可能，我就不能相信p。可用例子来证明这一点。如果我相信利物浦队没有可能赢得英格兰足总杯，那么（如果没有下面讨论会出现很多替代者的情况）我就不会相信他们会取胜。 然而，我们反过来想会怎样呢？假定我确实相信P是可能的，我就必定会相信p吗？很明显，如果要么我相信p, 要么我相信非p，我就必定相信P。但没有相信p，或者相信非p，我就不能相信p是可能的吗？如果我相信p 是非常非常可能的，毫无疑问，我会相信p。我们前面说到的情况经常就是后面说到的情况。如果我相信利物浦队将赢得足总杯是非常非常可能的， 那么我就会相信利物浦队会获胜。当我相信p比非p稍稍多一些可能时， 困难才会出现。在这里，对是否应该说我相信p,我们可能会犹豫不决。这种犹豫的产生不是出自对任何未观察到的事物的无知，而是因为信念的概念的使用规则不够精确。**也许有些人说话时确实使用“相信”，以至于如果S要相信P，那么s必须相信p比非p显然更有可能。但可以肯定的是，一般人将允许，S相信p,只是由于S仅仅相信p比非p稍微多一些可能。遵从后者的这种用法似乎更有条理。**因为若我们不遵从这种用法，将必有某种在1/2与1之间的可能性的值θ,只有某人相信p的可能性大于θ的时候， 他才会相信P。但任何精选的θ值都将是极其武断的。我的结论是，虽然我们使用这些语词的日常规则，对于我所建议的作为一种清楚而正确的日常用法来说，可能不够精确，但有这样一种情况，如果我们有一个“相信” 的清楚概念，令用法更严格，我所建议的这些语词就能确实表达一种分析的(即逻辑必然的)真理。
- 【
<strong>barring considerations to be discussed below arising from the existence of a number of alternatives</strong>，<strong>如果排除下面将要讨论的存在若干替代者的情况</strong>，或许比“ <strong>如果没有下面讨论会出现很多替代者的情况</strong> ”清楚】 - 【 Suppose that I do believe that p is probable, must I believe that P? Clearly, if either I am to believe that p or I am to believe that not-p, I must believe the former. But might I not believe that p is probable without believing that p or believing that not-p? If I believe that p is very very probable, surely I believe that p. Cases where we would say the former are always cases where we would say the latter. 假设我的确相信p是可能的，我必定相信p吗？显然，如果我必须相信p或者非p，我必定会相信前者。但我若不必相信p或非p，我就不能相信p是可能的吗？如果我相信p是非常非常可能的，我当然相信p。当我采用前一种说法时，我总是可以采用后一种说法来表达同样的意思。这里的Cases where we would say the former are always cases where we would say the latter，指的是“当我说p非常非常可能”时，我总是表示“我相信p”。——原来的译法是这样：假定我确实相信P是可能的，我就必定会相信p吗？很明显，如果要么我相信p, 要么我相信非p，我就必定相信P。但没有相信p，或者相信非p，我就不能相信p是可能的吗？如果我相信p 是非常非常可能的，毫无疑问，我会相信p。我们前面说到的情况经常就是后面说到的情况。】
- 【Maybe some speakers do use ‘believe’ so that S has to believe that p is significantly more probable than not if S is to believe that p. But certainly others are prepared to allow that S believes that p if S believes merely that p is marginally more probable than not. 也许有些人的确这样使用“相信”一词，即，只有当S相信p的概率显著地大于非p时，他们才会说S相信p。但无疑其他人情愿认为，只要S相信p比非p的概率大一点，就说S相信p。——原来的译法： 也许有些人说话时确实使用“相信”，以至于如果S要相信P，那么s必须相信p比非p显然更有可能。但可以肯定的是，一般人将允许，S相信p,只是由于S仅仅相信p比非p稍微多一些可能。遵从后者的这种用法似乎更有条理。】
Although normally the sole alternative to a belief that p is its negation, sometimes there will be other alternatives. This will be the case where p is one of a number of alternatives being considered in a certain context. In that case to believe that p will be to believe that p is more probable than any one of these alternatives (but not necessarily more probable than the disjunction of the alternatives). Suppose that we are discussing who will win the FA Cup and several teams are being considered. Let p = ‘Liverpool will win the Cup’, q = ‘Leeds will win the Cup’, r = ‘Manchester United will win the Cup’, and so on. Suppose that S believes that p is more probable than q, or than r, or than any similar proposition, but not more probable than not-p, ‘Liverpool will not win the Cup’ (the disjunction of q, r, and similar propositions). Does he then believe that p? Again, I do not think that ordinary usage is very clear, but I am inclined to think that it favours the view that it is correct to say that S does believe that p. If we asked S ‘Who do you believe will win the Cup?’, he would surely not be lying if he said ‘Liverpool’ rather than ‘I do not believe of any particular team that it will win’. For this reason my earlier suggestion must be expressed as follows: S believes that p if and only if he believes that p is more probable than any alternative. The normal alternative is not-p, but p may, on occasion, be contrasted with several alternatives. So the meaning of ‘S believes that Liverpool will win the Cup’ will vary with the contrast being made. If the talk is about whether Liverpool will win or not, then to believe that Liverpool will win, I have to believe that it is more probable than not that Liverpool will win; whereas if the talk is about which of a number of clubs will win, to believe that Liverpool will win I have to believe that it is more probable that Liverpool will win than that any other club will win. 通常来说，一个信念P的唯一替代者是它的否定式，但有时也会有其他的替代者。例如在某种语境下，P是许多被考虑的替代者中的一个。这样的话，相信P就是相信P比这些替代者中的任何一个都更有可能［但不一定比这些替代者的析取式(disjunction)更有可能］。假定我们现正谈论谁将赢得足总杯，并且有几支球队是我们考虑的对象。设P为“利物浦队将赢得足总杯”，q为“利兹队(Leeds)将赢得足总杯”，r为“曼联队将赢得足总杯”，等等。假定S相信，p比q、比r,或者比任何类似的主张都更有可能，但不一定比非p即“利物浦队不会赢得足总杯”(q、r和类似命题的析取)更有可能。那么，他就会相信p吗？重申一次，我不认为日常用法非常清楚，但我倾向于认为日常用法支持这种观点，即“S确实相信p”可算是正确的。如果我们问S： “你认为哪支球队会赢得足总杯？”如果他说“利物浦队”，而不是“我不相信任何一支特定的球队会赢得足总杯”，那么他肯定没有说谎。正因为这个理由，我先前提出的建议必须表述如下: S相信p,当且仅当(if and only if)他相信p比任何替代者更有可能。标准的替代者是非p,但p有时可以与几个替代者作对比。因此，“S相信利物浦队将赢得足总杯”的含义，将随着所提出的对比者(the contrast)的不同而不同。如果谈论的是利物浦队是否会赢，为了相信利物浦队会赢, 我就必须相信利物浦队会赢比不会赢更有可能；如果谈论的是许多球队中哪一支会赢，为了相信利物浦队会赢，我就必须相信利物浦队会赢比任何其他球队会赢更有可能。
Not everyone who believes that p has an explicit belief about p’s probability: young children, for example, do not have the concept of probability. But my point is that all belief is contrastive and that we can use the concept of probability to draw out what is involved in such contrasts by attributing to believers more explicit beliefs than they may sometimes possess; and thereby (as we shall see) show the consequences of belief for action. Henceforward I shall assume that beliefs can be expressed as beliefs about relative probability, even if not all believers can express this aspect of their beliefs in words. A belief that p is, then, a strong belief to the extent to which the subject believes that p is a lot more probable than not-p. 不是每个相信p的人都有关于p的可能性的明确信念。例如，幼儿就没有“可能性”这个概念。但我的观点是，所有信念都是对比的，而通过赋予相信者（believers ）比他们有时可能拥有的、更明确的信念，我们可以用可能性的概念得出在这种对比中包含着什么；并因而（正如我们将会 看到的）揭示用于行动的信念的结果。自这以后，我将假定，即使不是所有的相信者都可以用语词来表述他们信念的这个方面，信念也可以表述为关于相对可能性的信念。如果主体相信p比非p有更大可能，在这个意义上，信念p就是一个强信念（strong belief）。（不是每个相信p的人都有关于p的概率的明确信念。例如，幼儿就没有概率的概念。但我的观点是，所有信念都是对比性的，因此我们可以借着赋予信念者有时不自觉的，但更加明确的信念，使用概率的概念以分析其信念对比的内涵；并借此（正如我们将会看到的）揭示信念造成的行动后果。从此以后，我将假定信念可以表达为有关相对概率的信念，即使并非所有信念者都可用这样的术语来描述他们的信念。于是，若主体相信p比非p的概率大得多，信念p就是一个强信念。）
We can now apply our claim that belief is relative to alternatives to religious beliefs. The normal alternative today to ‘there is a God’ is its negation ‘there is no God’. But to many more detailed religious beliefs in the past there were surely more alternatives than one. The alternatives, for example, to the orthodox faith of the Council of Chalcedon, that Christ had two natures in one person, might naturally be thought of as the various heresies that were its rivals—Nestorianism and monophysitism. In that case, someone who said that he believed that Christ had two natures in one person might thereby be committed only to believing that this view was more probable than that Christ had only one nature in his one person (monophysitism), and more probable than that Christ was really two persons (Nestorianism). Someone today who expresses his belief in such propositions may have various alternatives in mind, or he may simply have the negations in mind. Belief-that is relative to alternatives; and, where this is not realized or where the alternatives are not clearly specified, a person who expresses belief may not be saying anything very clear. 现在，我们可以把我们的主张，即信念是相对于替代者的，应用到宗教信念上。在当今，“有一个上帝”的标准替代者是它的否定式即“没有上帝”。但对于过去许多更具体的宗教信念来说，确实不止一个替代者。例 如,对迦克墩大公会议中的正统信仰“基督一位格两性”来说，其替代者自然可能被当作各种不同的异端邪说，这些异端邪说就是它的竞争对手, 即聂斯脱利主义（Nestorianism）和基督一性论。在那种情况下，某人说他相信“基督一位格两性”，也许只是相信，这种观点比“基督一位格一性（基督一性论）更有可能，以及比“基督实际上是两个人”（聂斯脱利主义） 更有可能。在当今，某人用这些命题表达他的信念，心里可能有不同的替代者，或者他心里可能只有命题的否定式。相信什么是相对于替代者的； 当没有认识到这种观点或者没有清楚规定替代者,一个人想要表达自己的信念，也许对任何事情都无法说得很清楚。
- 【The alternatives, for example, to the orthodox faith of the Council of Chalcedon, that Christ had two natures in one person, might naturally be thought of as the various heresies that were its rivals—Nestorianism and monophysitism. 例如，我们可以自然地将这种与之竞争的异端信仰，即聂斯托利主义和基督一性论，视为迦克墩大公会议的正统信仰——“基督一位二性”——的替代者。——原译：例如,对迦克墩大公会议中的正统信仰“基督一位格两性”来说，其替代者**自然可能被当作各种不同的异端邪说**，这些异端邪说就是它的竞争对手, 即聂斯脱利主义（Nestorianism）和基督一性论。——这里应该是语法上处理失当。】
- 【在那种情况下，某人说他相信“基督一位格两性”，也许只是相信，这种观点比“基督一位格一性（基督一性论）更有可能，以及比“基督实际上是两个人”（聂斯脱利主义） 更有可能。——从教会史看，“基督实际是两个人”或许译为“基督实际有两个位格”（聂斯托利主义）比较好吧。】
I believe that this simple point, generally unrecognized, is of very considerable importance for the Christian religion. What it is to be a Christian believer is unclear until we have made clear what are the alternatives with which the propositions of Christianity are being contrasted. I suspect that in the course of twenty centuries there has developed a more restrictive understanding of what it is to be a Christian believer than existed earlier. In early centuries you had merely to believe that the whole Christian creed is more probable than each of various rivals. In later centuries you are often thought to have to believe that various items of the creed are each more probable than their negation, or that the whole creed is more probable than its negation. I shall argue at a little greater length for this historical conjecture when I come in Chapter 4 to distinguish between the different understandings in the Christian tradition of the nature of faith. When I come in Chapter 6 to consider the kind of faith, and so the kind of belief, that a church ought to demand of its adherents, I shall argue that, whether or not this historical conjecture is correct, the Christian Church of recent centuries has sometimes been too demanding in the beliefs which it requires of its adherents. 我相信，这个通常没有人认识的简单观点，对基督宗教来说，具有非常重要的意义。直到我们解释清楚什么是与基督教命题作对比的替代者后， 成为基督教信徒的含义是什么才显得清楚。我猜测，在二十个世纪里，对于成为基督教信徒的含义是什么，我们提出了一种比以前更严格的理解。 在先前的世纪里你不得不相信，整个基督教的信条比起不同竞争者中的任何一个都更有可能;在后来的世纪里，你常常不得不相信，信条中每一项不同的条文都比起它们的否定式更有可能，或者整个信条比它的否定式更有可能。在第四章，当我区分基督教传统中对信仰本质的不同理解时，我将用较长的篇幅来论证这个历史的猜想。在第6章中，当我考虑到教会要求其支持者信奉的那种信仰、那种信念时，我将论证这个历史的猜想是否正确，以及最近几个世纪的基督教教会对其支持者在信念上的要求有时是否过分严苛。
- 【我猜测，在二十个世纪里，对于成为基督教信徒的含义是什么，我们提出了一种比以前更严格的理解。in the course of twenty centuries, 在二十个世纪的发展过程中？】
- 【In early centuries you had merely to believe that the whole Christian creed is more probable than each of various rivals. 在先前的世纪里，你只需要相信作为整体的基督教信经比任何一个竞争者都更为可能即可。但在后来的世纪里，你常常会觉得自己必须相信信经的各个条款都比它们各自的否定式更有可能，或者整个信经比其否定式更加可能。——“在先前的世纪里你不得不相信……”】
- 【 When I come in Chapter 6 to consider the kind of faith, and so the kind of belief, that a church ought to demand of its adherents, I shall argue that, whether or not this historical conjecture is correct, the Christian Church of recent centuries has sometimes been too demanding in the beliefs which it requires of its adherents. 原译：在第6章中，当我考虑到教会要求其支持者信奉的那种信仰、那种信念时，我将论证这个历史的猜想是否正确，以及最近几个世纪的基督教教会对其支持者在信念上的要求有时是否过分严苛。——这可能是第一个严格意义上的误译。主要的问题是对“whether or not this historical conjecture is correct”处理不对。修改：在第6章中，当我考虑教会要求信众的信仰，也就是信众需要持有的信念时，我将论证，无论这个关于历史的猜想（按，即后来的世纪对信仰的要求更严厉）是否正确，最近几个世纪的基督教会有时对于信众的信念都提出了过分严苛的要求。】
The point that belief is relative to alternatives is connected closely with the issue of the conjunctivity of belief. If S believes that p and S believes that q (where p is being contrasted with not-p, and q with not-q), it does not follow that he believes ( p and q ) (where the alternative to this is its negation (not-both-p-and-q )). It follows only that he believes ( p and q ), where this is being contrasted with ( p and not-q ), ( q and not-p ), and (not-p and not-q ). For S may believe that it is more probable that in a match between them A will beat B rather than B beat A, and more probable that in a match between them C will beat D rather than D beat C, without believing that it is more probable that both A and C will win than that there will be any other outcome of the two matches. Hence it is that many a wise person believes that he has some false beliefs. He believes p, and believes q, and believes r, etc. because he believes that each is more probable than any alternative (and we may suppose that the only alternative is the negation), but he believes that ( p and q and r . . . ) is less probable than its negation, that is he believes that he has at least one false belief. The application to Christian creeds, understood as expressions of belief-that, should be apparent. One who believes the Nicene Creed may believe that each item is more probable than any alternative (and we may even suppose that the only alternative is the negation), or that the Creed as a whole is more probable than various detailed alternative creeds aswholes; but he need not believe that the Creed as a whole is more probable than its negation (i.e. the negation of the conjunction of all the items in the Creed, that is the proposition that says that there is a false itemin the Creed).Hemay still believe that somewhere in the Creed (he knows not where) he has made a mistake. 信念是相对于替代者的，这个观点与信念的合取性（conjunctivity）问题紧密相关。如果S相信p,而且S相信q ［在这里，p是与非p对比，q 是与非q对比），那么，由此得出的结论不是他相信“p和q” （在这里，替代者是它的否定式“不是P和q”（not-both-p-and-q）］。由此得出的结论仅仅是他相信“p和q”，在这里是与“p和非q”、“q和非p”以及“非p和 非q”对比的。因为S也许相信,在一场比赛中，A击败B比起B击败 A,是更有可能的，而在另一场比赛中，C击败D比起D击败C,是更有可能的；但S却不会因此相信A和C都会赢，比起这两场比赛的任何其他结果，都更有可能的。因此，许多明智的人都相信，他有一些错误的信念。他相信P，相信q，相信r，等等，因为他相信，每一个都比任何替代者（我们可以假定这个唯一的替代者就是其否定式）更有可能。然而他相信（P和q和r……）比它的否定式有较少的可能，这就是说，他相信他至少有一个错误的信念。这些观点显然可以应用到那些以相信什么来表述的基督教的信条上。相信《尼西亚信经》的人或许相信，这个信经中每一条条文都比任何替代者（而我们甚至可以假定这个唯一的替代者就是其否定式）更有可能，或者相信作为整体的这个信经比作为整体的各种具体的替代信经更有可能；然而，他并不需要相信，作为整体的这个信经比它的否定式（即这个信经中所有条文的合取的否定式，这就是说，“在这个信经中有一条错误的条文”这个命题）更有可能。他可能仍然相信，在这个信经的某处（他不知道是在哪里），他已经犯了一个错误。
- 【由此得出的结论仅仅是他相信“p和q”，在这里是与“p和非q”、“q和非p”以及“非p和 非q”对比的。表述上调整一下更清楚：由此得出的结论仅仅是，在与**“p和非q”、“q和非p”以及“非p和 非q”对比**时，他相信”p和q“。前面一句同。】
- 【因此，许多明智的人都相信，他有一些错误的信念。他相信P，相信q，相信r，等等，因为他相信，每一个都比任何替代者（我们可以假定这个唯一的替代者就是其否定式）更有可能。然而他相信（P和q和r……）比它的否定式有较少的可能，这就是说，他相信他至少有一个错误的信念。更清楚的表达或许是：因此，许多明智的人都相信自己存有一些错误的信念。他相信p，相信q，相信r，等等，因为他相信这些命题的每一个都必对应的替代者（我们可以假定唯一的替代者就是其否定式）更有可能。但他相信（p和q和r……）比其合取的否定式可能性更小，也就是说，他相信自己至少存有一个错误的信念。】
- 【The application to Christian creeds, understood as expressions of belief-that, should be apparent. 原译：这些观点显然可以应用到那些以相信什么来表述的基督教的信条上。这是一个误译。处理”should be apparent“不对。修改：这些观点在表述为”相信什么“的基督教信经上的应用应当是显而易见的。……】
后面还看了一节，不相信讨论了。仅说明两处，涉及圣经知识和逻辑。原书第10页：
I may believe it more probable that the Pharaoh of the Exile referred to in the Book of Genesis was Ramses II than that it was any other pharaoh.
原译：我也许相信，在《创世记》中提到的被流放的法老是兰塞II 世(**Ramses n)**比任何其他法老更有可能。
这里”流放的法老“大概应是让约瑟成为宰相，接收以色列全家下埃及（等于离开应许之地的Exile）时的法老。这是一个圣经知识的问题吧。
If he believes that A1 and A2 are equally likely to attain X, but more likely to attain X than any other available action, he will do either A1 or A2 in order to attain X. But if he believes that any action he may do (including doing nothing) would be equally likely to attain X (X is just as likely to happen whatever he does or does not do), he cannot do any action in order to attain X.
原译：如果他认为A1和A2同样可能实现 X，而且它们实现X的可能性比任何其他可以采取的行动更大，为了实现 X，他就会采取行动A1或者A2。然而，如果他认为，任何他可以采取的行 动（包括什么都不做）将同样可能实现X （无论他做什么或者什么都不做，x都同样可能发生），为了实现X，他就不会采取任何行动。
这里对”he will do”和“he cannot do any action in order to attain X”的逻辑理解有些问题。
修改： 然而，如果他认为，任何他可以采取的行 动（包括什么都不做）将同样可能实现X （无论他做什么或者什么都不做，x发生的可能性都一样），那么他不可能采取任何行动以实现X。
好了，我的分析完成了。照旧是述而不作，不说什么了。